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STATE LIABILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION:
AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVERALPH C. d'ARGE* and ALLEN V. KNEESE**
INTRODUCTION
State responsibility and liability are not clearly defined with
respect to environmental degradation. But a limited number of cases
and declarations by international tribunals do point in a definable
direction. In the famous Trail Smelter Case, the tribunal declared:
"A State owes at all times a duty to protect other states against
injurious acts by individuals from within its jurisdiction." 1 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
adopted the "polluter pays" principle (PP) in 1972, which states that
the waste discharger must pay for any ameliorating measures which
are caused to be undertaken. 2 This principle does not apply to any
residual damages which may remain. However, the German government has recently issued an interpretation which requires payment of
an effluent charge which presumably, in some manner, is meant to
reflect remaining damages within German territory.' The Stockholm
Declarations could also be interpreted as placing responsibility upon
those undertaking the actions which result in environmental degradation, although the emphasis is upon "common action" among
states. 4 The tendency then is to interpret state responsibility as
requiring that states within whose boundaries harmful actions occur
must pay or cause to be paid the cost of ameliorating those actions
and, possibly, must pay for the remaining damages as well.
In this paper, we shall define and analyze four major principles of
assigning state responsibility and discuss the economic meaning of
those principles. The first principle is that each state is responsible
for all waste discharge control costs internally and externally but is
not responsible for compensation of remaining damages following
*John S. Bugas Distinguished Professor of Economics, University of Wyoming.
**Senior Fellow, Resources for the Future, Inc., Washington, D.C.
1. Trail Smelter Case (United States v. Canada), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905, 1963
(1935) (emphasis added).
2. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, POLLUTER PAYS PRINCIPLE (1975).
3. See A. KNEESE & B. BOWER, MANAGING WATER QUALITY: ECONOMICS,
TECHNOLOGY, INSTITUTIONS (1968).
4. U.N. Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, Declaration on the Human
Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/4 (1972).
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installation of the agreed-upon controls. This is a variant of the
OECD principle cited above in that we apply it, as an area of major
concern, to transfrontier pollution problems; application of the principle to such problems was explicitly excluded by OECD member
nations. The second major principle is the full costing principle (FC),
which requires the state responsible for waste discharge to pay compensation for remaining damages as well as control costs. The third
principle is the "victim pays" principle (VP), which requires the
affected state to compensate the affecting state (or internal parties
creating harmful residuals) for all costs of control and to absorb all
residual damages after controls are implemented. The fourth principle, in its simplest form, requires the establishment of an internal
or international autonomous agency to regulate the joint use of common property resources by individual or multiple states. In the international case, the various states would give powers to the agency to
regulate waste discharges into the commonly shared environment.
For lack of a better description, we term this principle of responsibility the common property resource institution principle (CPRI). 5
With the exception of certain studies on economic warfare in international trade, the international economics literature appears devoid
of analyses encompassing non-aggressive involuntary exchanges that
are international in scope.6 This is in contrast to the very substantial
literature on such exchanges internal to a sovereign nation. Environmental interdependencies among sovereign nations, not regulated a
priori by international market or other forms of transactions, can be
viewed as one type of or cause for involuntary exchange. 7 For example, when one nation's industry emits water-borne residuals which
influence the productivity or utility of another nation's citizens, then
5. A fifth principle developed by OECD personnel and consultants is called the "mutual
compensation" principle: each country contributes to the solution of the problem by sharing control costs and/or damages. Because of the diversity of possible economic outcomes
from this type of principle, it will not be examined in detail here.
6. See M. KEMP, PURE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE ch. 4 (1964); H.
Wan, A Contribution to the Theory of Trade Warfare (1961) (unpublished doctoral thesis,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology). On transnational public goods problems two enlightening papers by Michael B. Connolly have appeared. Connolly, Trade in Public Goods:
A DiagrammaticAnalysis, 86 Q.J. ECON. 61 (1972); Connolly, Public Goods, Externalities,
and InternationalRelations, 78 J. POLITICAL ECON. 279 (1970). (Since this paper was
written and circulated, a number of economic studies on transfrontier pollution have been
written. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
PROBLEMS OF TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION (1974); 1.WALTER, INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMICS OF POLLUTION (1976).)
7. It must be kept in mind in a historical evolutionary context that externalities and
especially diseconomies in social relationships are perhaps one major reason for the existence of discrete nations and the role of national sovereignty as the dominant consideration
in world politics.
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in effect there is an involuntary exchange of wealth among nations.
External diseconomies in the domestic economy have been characterized as perceptible non-market interdependencies among economic units that arise inadvertently, without anticipation, or with
inadequate information by one or more of the parties involved. The
externality event is unforeseen as to its effects or not adequately
anticipated before occurrence. Coase, Buchanan, Kneese, and
Mishan, among others, have explicitly or implicitly applied this characterization. 8 In what follows we shall adhere to this characterization
and omit consideration of involuntary international exchanges which
arise by design (i.e., assertion of power and threat of warfare). Thus,
the class of problems we wish to address is unanticipated involuntary
international exchanges involving environmental interdependencies
among nations that lack markets or exchange processes of any kind
prior to their appearance.
From an economic perspective, there are two major issues in the
interpretation of international doctrines or laws applicable to transnational environmental problems. The first relates to prohibitions on
domestic activities affecting other nations, and the second to explicit
financial responsibility for harmful effects. There is a body of international law concerned with constraints on a nation's activities which
prescribes certain doctrines of behavior. The common maxim applicable as a constraint is: use your own property so as to not injure
your neighbor's and every state's obligation [is to] not allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to other states.9 These
general principles delineate both constraints to activities and assertions of responsibility. Note, however, that they are implicit with
regard to specification of property ownership, and the allocation of
common property resource ownership, or jointly used resources, is
not identified. Further, the bulk of common law on oceans, the
major common property resource of recognized importance thus far,
is concerned with the establishment of principles of access and the
"right of use" but not with constraints on use. The precedent-setting
Trail Smelter Case between the United States and Canada in 1935
established that "under the principles of international law ..., no

State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such
manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another
8. Buchanan & Stubblebine, Externality, 29 ECONOMICA 17 (n.s. 1962); Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); Mishan, The Postwar Literature on
Externalities: An Interpretative Essay, 9 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1 (1971).
9. See C. BRAMSEN, TRANSNATIONAL POLLUTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
(OECD restricted series, Aug. 1972); C. JENKS, THE COMMON LAW OF MANKIND
(1958).
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or the properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious
consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing
evidence."'" More recently, the United Nations General Assembly
passed a resolution that each nation has the sovereign right to formulate its own environmental policies, provided "in the exercise of such
right and in the implementation of such policies due account must be
taken of the need to avoid producing harmful effects on other countries."''I The U.N. Stockholm Conference Declaration went even
further in stating that nations have "the responsibility to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to
the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction."' ' 2 The Stockholm Declaration begins to introduce a more encompassing criterion of responsibility by referring to
all areas beyond jurisdictional limits. Also, instead of "due account"
being taken of damages to other countries, the specification is made
that no damages be caused.
To summarize this very brief discussion, existing common law and
United Nations declarations appear to prohibit domestic activities
which cause environmentally harmful effects to other countries. In
so doing, this body of law implicitly provides constraints to potential
actions within countries but does not provide meaningful economic
guidelines of responsibility. Implicitly the responsible country is the
one initiating the activity that causes damages.
The initiating country, however, may be hard to discover. The
following cases illustrate this point: (1) a country's tanker spills oil
and damages the coastline of a second country; (2) a country's residents undergo a shift in preferences (due to rising income and affluence) and begin to suffer aesthetic damages due to previously unrecognized air pollution from an adjacent country; (3) a downstream
country decides to expand irrigated agriculture onto desert lands
where salt flushing is required but finds that an upstream country is
contributing salts into return flows to the common river, precluding
flushing and efficient production in the downstream country; (4) one
downstream country decides to use internal resources-i.e., rivers and
airsheds-as total waste disposal resources and common property
rivers as predominantly recreational resources.
In the first example, responsibility is quite clearly delineated. But
in the other examples, responsibility is imperfectly clear. Certainly in
10. Trail Smelter Case (United States v. Canada), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905, 1965

(1935).
11. U.N. Doc. A/RES.2849(XXV1) at 2 (1971).
12. U.N. Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, Declaration on the Human
Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/4, at 4 (1972).
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the fourth case there is an element of monopoly of the downstream
country working to require the upstream country, provided it is
identified as being responsible, to pay for controls exceeding what it
would normally need to pay. International doctrines have provided
direction on assigning responsibility for external diseconomies and in
establishing constraints on knowingly initiating activities which
create damages transnationally. However, as was argued earlier, externalities have been viewed as inadvertent actions resulting from inadequate prior information and negotiation by the parties involved.
The "laws" do not specify which is the responsible country or how
such responsibility should be determined.
The classical economic solution to externality problems is to
"internalize" them either by developing a well-defined market for
the "spillovers" or by controlling them through collective provision
of regulations. Neither of these possibilities appears easily amenable
to the problem of transnational externalities in general and environmental externalities in particular. First, environmental externalities
have arisen because most dimensions of the natural environment on a
regional or global scale are resources without defined ownership
rights or rights of use. The oceans, stratosphere, and electromagnetic
spectrum are examples. These resources are viewed as being commonly owned or not owned at all. A nation that agrees to a partic
ular pattern of ownership could potentially lose some of its implicitly controlled resources and thereby decrease its national
wealth.' I As long as international entitlements are obscure, any
nation can lay implicit claim to the common property resource
exceeding any equitable share it may presume to receive if entitle13. Christy has emphasized that a major element in the common property problems of
oceans is differences in perceived entitlement and consequent wealth of the common property users. Christy also draws a distinction between the production of wealth and the
distribution or ownership of wealth with regard to ocean fisheries: the first concept involves
issues of access and free use, while the second involves specification of shares. The discussion in this paper will be centered on distributional as opposed to use or access issues. It
appears that the issue of open access in fisheries competition and regulation is the polar
opposite of transnational external diseconomies, but it has implications for management not
highly dissimilar. The distinguishing feature appears to be that with fisheries there are
incentives for rapid exploitation if non-coordination prevails between countries. Alternatively, with environmental diseconomies that are reciprocal between countries, there appear
to be "built in" incentives for unilateral control in that such control implies at least a small
amount of environmental improvement. This idea was first expressed, to our knowledge, by
Anthony Scott. However, if one country perceives that regardless of what its actions are,

other countries will treat a common property resource as a sewer, it is hard to imagine it
would do otherwise. See Christy, Fisheries: Common Property, Open Access, and the Common Heritage, in E. BORGESE, PACEM IN MARIBUS 183 (1972); Scott, The Economics
of International Transmission of Pollution, in ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, PROBLEMS OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS

(1972).
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ment were made explicit. This is not to say that, once some other
nation impinges on a nation's implicit entitlement, it will not find a
negotiated settlement and explicit entitlement to be superior to an
implicit one. However, the affected nation, in negotiating, must
revise downward its own perception of ownership of the common
property resource. In consequence, proceeding from a situation of
implicit entitlement of common property resources to explicit regulation and thereby ownership implies that some (or all) nations must
reduce their perception of national wealth.
A second aspect of major importance arises from the concept of
national sovereignty. Like consumer sovereignty as conceptualized
by economists, national sovereignty involves the idea that governments, acting in their own interest, will, omitting considerations of
deviation in power or information, achieve the greatest welfare for
themselves by independently pursuing autonomous goals and interacting through organized international markets. The belief in
national sovereignty and independent decision-making as an ideal is
so embedded that it seems impractical to presume it will be given up
14
easily.
In the remainder of this paper we examine assignments of polluter
responsibility under the four principles cited earlier, and one perhaps
more immediately realizable alternative, in terms of their implications for efficiency of the international economy. We also comment
on some related matters-predominantly equity implications and
enforceability. In doing so we find it useful to discuss several kinds
of case situations separately, since they carry different interpretations for the matters of interest here. First we briefly introduce each
of the cases and then discuss each one in more detail.
TAXONOMY OF SITUATIONS
Direct "Technological Externalities"
The archetype of an international environment problem is where
activities in one country have a direct (non-market) impact on production or consumption activities in another country. This occurs via
some common environmental medium such as a watercourse, the
common air mantle, or a large ecological system. Such impacts may
14. This is not to suggest that governments through cooperation or by forming coalitions
embodying common interests do not attempt to internalize externalities of a positive sort.
NATO, EEC, LAFTA, and EFTA are just a few counterexamples. The important distinction, however, is that each country is not bound irrevocably to accept decisions unfavorable
to it or even to continue participation in such coliective arrangements. This is demonstrated
by the recent discussion on the possible United States withdrawal from several U.N. agencies
because of foreign domination of their administrative structures.
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be bilateral or multilateral, unidirectional or reciprocal, or various
combinations of these. Salt pollution of the Rio Grande is a unidirectional-bilateral case with water as the medium. Destruction of
wildfowl habitat in Canada is unidirectional-multilateral (affecting
the U.S. and Mexico) with an ecological system as the medium.
Pollution of the Baltic Sea is multilateral-reciprocal, again with water
as the medium. It is readily seen that these cases vary greatly in
both structure and complexity and may have differing implications
for a concept of state responsibility.
Effects on a Universal Common PropertyResource
Excessive environmental degradation results from adverse impacts
on a common property resource (CPR)-that is, one in regard to
which market exchange does not function or functions only very
imperfectly. Thus the Rhine River and the stratosphere are CPRs
because they cannot be easily parcelled into units suitable for exchange in domestic and international markets. But defined state sovereignties do cover their entire reach. The deep oceans and the atmosphere over them are CPRs in an even more far-reaching sense, since
they are not even covered by state jurisdiction. We term them universal CPRs.
One example of why this situation is important may be helpful. In
the case where national sovereignties are directly involved, at least
one sovereignty (the damaged one) will have an incentive to generate
information and even take action (bribe polluters to reduce waste
discharges). Where national sovereignties over the resource are not
defined, such incentives are absent until pronounced feedback effects
reach a national sovereignty. Accordingly, it is quite possible for an
activity (say dumping of high-level radioactive wastes in eventually
corrodable containers) to reach a potentially catastrophic level with
the only limiting direct incentive being the fear of feedback effects
on the party doing the activity. This may not in principle be different from the previous case in terms of ultimate state responsibility. It
is importantly different in terms of the indirectness of effects and
the different context of incentives within which such responsibility
occurs.
Preferencesfor Fixed Site EnvironmentalFeaturesin Another
Sovereignty
Many market-type goods can be produced in one sovereignty and
not another and yet be desired there-e.g., Mandarin oranges in
England. This fact plus differences in the comparative advantage of
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producing other goods are the sources of international trade. But
some goods which cannot be exported are produced by nature in
certain jurisdictions. Examples are unique biological amenities (those
of the Serengeti) and unique geomorphological features (Murchison
Falls). The only way citizens of another sovereignty can directly
experience their benefits is to travel greater or lesser distances to
observe them. Thus the market can function, at least if there are no
travel restrictions. But the market does not by any means function
perfectly. Since many persons are uncertain whether they will ever
experience such attractions, but would like to, an option demand not
expressed through markets may exist. Moreover, there seem to be
many persons who care greatly about the existence of such amenities
even though they never expect, or even hope, to experience them. In
principle, the destruction or diminution of such features is a technological externality quite like the direct technological externalities
discussed above. They are of the type where an activity in one country enters directly into the welfare of individuals in another. But the
often irreversible nature of the destruction of such amenities, the
difficulty of evaluating them, and the fact that they are usually
located in developing countries while preferences for them are
strongest in developed countries have unique implications for state
responsibility.
ProblemsAssociated with InternationalTrade
A conclusion derived from economic theory is that if all markets,
domestic and international, are competitive and if free trade exists,
the processes of exchange will normally generate a Pareto optimumthat is, a situation in which there are no further gains from trade and
consumer preferences are fulfilled to a maximum, given the resource
endowments of nations and the distribution of resources within and
among them. A usually unstated but implied assumption is that there
are no CPRs. The theory can be extended to conclude that such an
optimum could be achieved anyway if a public agency priced all
CPRs in such a way as to obtain a Pareto optimum in their use as
well. But even without direct international technological externalities, differences in the way CPRs are handled internally in the
various trading nations can cause distortions in the international
economy which lead to transitional problems or a permanently lessthan-optimal use of global resources. If one country prices CPRs (say
by levying effluent charges) and another subsidizes industries to
induce them to control use of CPRs, there will be a shift in the
international relative costs not adequately reflecting real differences
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in factor endowments, including CPRs. Even if all countries wish to
"internalize" external costs by using similar policy tools, they may
hesitate to act unilaterally for fear of adjustment impacts such as
temporary unemployment or balance of payments disequilibrium.
Special Problems Associated with ParticularEntities
Developing Countries. In principle, both developing countries and
developed countries should act on the same principles with respect to
transnational aspects of environment, since both presumably have a
common interest in the efficiency of the international system. As a
practical matter there are many difficulties. Since technology transfer is, in general, one-directional from the more developed to the less
developed world, the former may inadvertently, or by design, create
for the developing countries a technology requiring too high a cost
for environmental protection given their circumstances and preferences. Also, the developing countries have been the recipients of
unilateral financial transfers from the developed world (at least at the
governmental level), and they fear that emphasis on environmental
improvement in the latter may cut back on these transfers. The
ability of developing countries to analyze and monitor adverse environmental effects is vastly less than that of developed countries
where, needless to say, it is none too adequate.
Multinational Corporations. In recent years, multinational corporations have grown rapidly; they now conduct much of the business
of the international economy. They have the advantage of relatively
easy information and experience transfer among countries and may
be able to adapt more readily to environmental policies than their
domestic counterparts. On the other hand, their vast capacity to
generate technological and economic information (or perhaps misinformation) could be used to intimidate local authorities. Similarly,
the greater international factor mobility they are said to represent
may make them less dependent on specific national locations and
may improve their bargaining power with states beyond that of their
domestic counterparts. Again new facets of state responsibility show
themselves.
DISCUSSION OF SITUATIONS
Direct Technological Externalities
The Bilateral Case. We have mentioned four possible principles of
state responsibility in the introduction. There are a number of variants of these basic principles. For example, one may have a "pollu-
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ter pays" principle where paying for pollution is acceptable only
through reducing emissions in the polluting country. Or the emitter
country may be responsible for damage compensation to receptor
countries while the receptors are responsible for paying control costs
to the emitting country in addition to their own defensive expenditures.
The current implied legal doctrine that each country must pay for
transnational pollution by ceasing activities that cause it may for
various reasons (including the difficulty of estimating damages, especially internationally) be adopted as the best practical type of polluter pays principle, but it can be shown to be inefficient in many
instances. Let us suppose that agriculture in Arizona is very much
more productive than downstream in Mexico and that the only way
to reduce salt content downstream is to take land out of cultivation
upstream. Then the current legal doctrine offers the following
choice: let the Mexicans continue to suffer uncompensated losses or
take more productive land out upstream and replace it with less
productive land downstream. Other considerations aside, a PP principle with compensatory flexibility would be more efficient, since
agricultural production across both countries could be maintained at
a higher level and the parties involved could share the gain through
compensation arrangements to the betterment of both.
Under certain simplified conditions, it can be shown that the VP
and PP principles applied to transnational pollution problems both
produce Pareto efficiency in the short run and the long run if consumers and factors of production are immobile internationally.'I
The only difference between the two is in the international distribution of income. This result might lead one to favor the VP principle
for the simple reason that it can be implemented without international enforcement machinery which in the past has proved so
intractable. The damaged party has an incentive both to get information and to bargain with the sovereignty within which the offending activity is taking place. The principle also has the advantage that
the willingness of the affected sovereignty to pay for reduction provides a quantitative estimate of the damage loss, which might otherwise be very hard to calculate. But aside from the fact that most
people would probably consider the arrangement quite inequitable, it
has another basic flaw. If the VP principle is applicable, the exter15. See R. d'Arge, On the Economics of Transnational Environmental Externalities
(1972) (paper presented at the Conference on Economics of the Environment, sponsored by
Universities-National Bureau Committee for Economic Research and Resources for the
Future, Chicago).
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nality-generating country may threaten (by giving high estimates of
future loads) to discharge materials as an incidental aspect of the
production of other goods simply to obtain compensation for not
doing so. One may hypothesize that polluting material could be produced at low cost. Thus, if the VP principle were to be applied, an
aspect of state responsibility would have to be structured to remove
the incentives underlying "pollution for profit."
Of course, under the PP or FC principles, the injured country
could also exaggerate its losses, but it is not in the superior position
which would permit it to exact retribution if its demands are not
met. Thus, there seem to be significant preliminary grounds for
preferring the FC or PP principles for both efficiency and equity
reasons.
Before turning to the multilateral case, we should point out that
the theoretical symmetry among the PP, FC, and VP principles indicated above is dependent upon the assumption (usually made in the
classical international trade literature) that resources are immobile
internationally. If this is not the case, capital or labor movements
will cause the outcomes of the principles to differ.
We now proceed to a rather technical discussion of the efficiency
properties of the various principles in the context of an international
economy. The most efficient operation, use, or allocation of a common property resource (CPR), be it national or international in
impact, is to design a management-ownership-rights solution which
will operate to maximize global rent of the CPR. A full costing
principle means that there is a payment between emitter and receptor countries, with the normal presumption that the emitter country
will tax (and/or require emissions contracts from) internal polluters
and the receptor country will provide payment to the internal damaged parties. In this case, the countries act as neutral (and presumed
costless) allocators of funds, but in so doing they perpetrate international inefficiencies unless one or both governments take additional control measures. The inefficiency occurs because other governments or private negotiators are not directly and competitively
involved to remove the distorting impact on profit rates of firms or
consumer prices. In consequence, with resources internationally
mobile, resources will be inefficiently allocated in a global context.
A rigorous proof of this assertion is given elsewhere. 1 6 What we
wish to do here is provide a heuristic argument justifying this conclusion for the bilateral case where emissions from the emitter country's
16. See id
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firms raise production costs in the receptor country. To make the
case simple and tractable, we shall omit considerations of control
costs for the emitter country or defensive expenditures by the receptor country. Thus, reduction in damage can only come about
through reduced production in either the emitter or receptor country. We shall also assume that damage costs increase at an increasing
rate with increased output of firms in the emitter country for any
positive and constant level of output by firms in the receptor country.
If the firms in the emitter country are taxed by their government
according to total damages, total damage payments will be less than
optimal damage payments because of the assumption of increasing
marginal damages with increasing output. The net effect is to decrease the average cost in the emitter industry below that of the
optimum but above average cost without compensation. Thus, at the
zero profit point for each firm where average costs are minimized,
output per firm is necessarily lower than the optimum, while price is
also lower. Both price and output per firm are below what is optimum for the emitter country, and this implies that total output is
too large for the industry taken as a whole. This result occurs because price for the country's output can only be lower than the
optimum if industry output is larger than the optimum, given that
market price falls with greater quantity delivered to the market. Thus
in the emitter country the price of the domestic product is too low
and production is excessive, which means, if there is international
mobility of resources, that too many resources will be utilized there.
A parallel situation arises in the receptor country. Since all firms are
now totally compensated for damages, average costs are lower than
they would be if payments were made contingent on marginal damages. The net effect is to cause firms to produce at a lower price and
lower output, but by the arguments given above, total output in the
receptor country must be excessive. In consequence, there is an overallocation of international resources to the receptor country as well.
What we observe is a distortion in the international flow of resources
resulting from an implied non-competitive use of the CPR linking the
emitter and receptor counties.
The FC principle could be made efficient, allowing for international mobility of resources, if the emitter country taxed its own
firms according to marginal damages and then refrained from paying
the receptor country, or if for some reason the receptor country's
government was convinced that damage payments would not be
rebated to the internally affected industry. It might be easier in an
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international context to get agreement on the FC principle if a stipulation of no transfer of funds among states was accepted.
With the PP principle, we observe international distortions with
mobility of resources even if the level of emissions is agreed upon in
advance. Here average costs of the emitting firm rise by less than the
optimum, since residual damages are not compensated. The net
effect is likely to be a less-than-optimal price and output per firm in
the emitting country and thus excess international resources committed in the long run. The receptor country's firms have reduced
damages but are not compensated for residual damage. In consequence, average costs will decrease but it is uncertain whether the
decrease will be greater or less than what is globally optimal.
Under the victim pays principle, average costs of emitters are
below the optimum and, through higher short term profits, entry of
new firms will be encouraged. With international resource mobility,
new firms will continue to enter until excess profits are eliminated.
But as the number of firms expands and prices decline, the amount
the receptor country's firms pay will increase to the point where
profits are negative or at least not excessive. The long-run adjustment
therefore should generally lead to excessive resources being committed to the emitter country and too few resources to the receptor
country. Such a situation may also not be stable, since at equilibrium
firms in the receptor country must make excess profits to pay compensation, and without further governmental regulation it will be
advantageous for individual firms at the margin to break away from
the coalition and not pay their share of the compensation. This
condition occurs because, with increasing marginal damages, the
amount paid by any one firm will exceed its losses at the margin by
being subject to an additional amount of waste discharge.
The Multilateral Case. With multi-country environmental problems, assessment of the efficiency of the previously stated principles
in allocating global resources is much less clear than in the bilateral
case just analyzed. As an example, consider one upstream country
with waste discharges affecting two downstream countries. With the
FC principle, there is the problem of arriving at an agreement between the downstream countries about which is damaged the most
and which should consequently be compensated the most. The PP
principle contains similar problems in that there must be joint agreement on acceptable levels of upstream control. Finally, the VP principle is fraught with so-called "free-rider" problems in that, if one
country provides a substantial amount of the necessary controls, the
second downstream country receives reduced damages at no cost. If,
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in general, there are more receptor countries than emitters, then it
will be more difficult, in terms of coordination, for a solution to
emerge under the VP principle than under the FC principle. This
result follows because the agreement on compensation requires a
greater number of sovereignties arranging to make a payment, which
inherently seems more difficult to negotiate than those same sovereignties agreeing to receive a payment.
Summary. The various principles of state responsibility have substantially different impacts on the global efficiency of resources
unless there are no transfers of resources among nations. With no
transfers or movements, the various principles tend to affect only the
distribution of wealth among nations. In terms of allocative efficiency, the "best" principle would be one of converting all CPRs to
internationally operated and regulated resources. But such a conversion may imply substantial changes in wealth and therefore may be
unacceptable. The principle with the most desirable efficiency properties would appear to be a modified FC principle where the emitter
country's government taxed internal firms according to receptor
country damages but did not provide compensation to the receptor
country.
Solutions for Universal Common PropertyResources
It appears that the principle of common ownership among nations
of universal common property resources can be presumed. Without
offensive actions or viable non-market threats, it is unreasonable to
conclude that any single nation could openly appropriate a universal
CPR or that it would be in the national interest of any sovereignty to
exclude itself voluntarily from ownership. However, the central issue
on the efficient use of universal CPRs concerns the right of access
and use, as has been demonstrated by the various coastal boundary
disputes. A single nation with access to a common property resource
has economic incentives to utilize it inefficiently, not unlike a petroleum firm pumping from a common pool. The petroleum firm will
pump more than is optimal because if it does not, some other firm
will reduce its share. Again, the economic principle which will lead to
greatest global efficiency is likely to be the common property resource institution rule (CPRI) cited earlier, which allocates the CPR
according to highest-valued use. But such a principle appears absurd
in view of national sovereignty and the character of universal CPRs.
For example, it seems ludicrous to presume that any nation would
formally and voluntarily relinquish allocative choice-making for the
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stratosphere and its services over the country.' 7 None of the bilateral principles for adjudicating economic responsibility appears to
offer meaningful guidelines for universal CPRs. However, with a few
notable exceptions, the FC principle is the principle of state responsibility with the most desirable economic efficiency characteristics
where universal CPRs are not directly regulated by supra-national
organizations.' I This is because the degree of distortion between
domestic-international prices and domestic social costs is then minimized. In application it could, at best, resemble the theoretical ideal
only crudely because of great difficulties of evaluation and enforcement. There is at present no body of international law that could
make the principle enforceable in practice. The same can be said
about the less efficient PP principle. Without some substantial innovations and revisions in the international order, we will be stuck,
de facto, with the VP principle as the main device for dealing with
universal CPR problems.
One variant of the CPRI principle which may merit discussion
because of its incentive structure and resulting efficiency properties,
and which might possibly be practical, is the establishment of an
international fund into which each country would automatically pay
some proportion of its GNP or a sum related to its actual use of
universal CPRs. The fund would be administered by an international
body having two major responsibilities: to concern itself with universal common property resources and to act as an international tribunal
awarding compensation to sovereignties that suffer damages from
transnational externalities. An example of the first kind of responsibility would be cleaning up or controlling an oil spill occurring in
international waters. Costs would be assessed against that portion of
the fund supplied by the country under whose flag the ship sailed.
That country presumably would have an incentive to shift all or at
least some of this cost back to the company owning the tanker and
thereby provide an incentive for safer operations. In its second role,
the agency would hear claims for damages resulting from transnational externalities. The victim's sovereignty could confront the
active party, or in reciprocal cases, the parties could confront each
17. It might be noted that in the case of atomic weapons testing and space vehicular
travel, involuntary allocation has already occurred. However, the ban on intra-continental
travel of SST-type planes is an example of a case where potential involuntary allocation of
stratospheric services is at least partially controllable.
18. The main exceptions are the situation of preferences for fixed site assets in another
sovereignty and the principle of multilateral action with respect to international trade
aspects.
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other, in what would amount to an adversary proceeding. After hearing evidence, the international tribunal would make awards, taking
the necessary funds from that portion of the fund contributed by the
nation judged responsible for the damage. If such damages were of a
continuing variety rather than once and for all, the payments would
be assessed at an annual rate to be diminished or terminated upon
demonstration that ameliorating measures had been taken. The
important characteristic of this variant of the CPRI rule is that it
provides a form of insurance to nations damaged by use of universal
CPRs by other nations, and thus to some extent it recognizes implicit
entitlement to universal CPRs. And this "insurance" need not necessarily be contingent on identifying the CPR user nation(s), though
for global efficiency in most cases such identification is necessary.
Preferencesfor Fixed Site EnvironmentalFeaturesin
Another Sovereignty
Not infrequently, unique or rare natural environments are destroyed or blemished because of the inability of a state to regulate its
internal industrial, mining, or agricultural activities or to foresee the
future value of these resources. No doubt there is widespread regret
that the Hetchy Valley in California has been devoted to a water
supply reservoir and that uranium mining was permitted on the rim
of the Grand Canyon. In the discussion that follows, we assume away
internal enforcement problems and short sightedness, although these
are no doubt important determinants of what is happening to the
natural world.
The case we consider here is this: a state within which a unique or
rare natural feature resides does not accord it sufficiently high value
to wish to preserve it in the face of development pressure, but the
residents of another state do value it enough that, if their preferences
counted, the feature would be preserved. There are many cases which
may fall into this category, and they are often characterized by
considerable urgency in terms of a rational decision.
A case in point is Kenya, which occupies some of the best of the
East African wildlife country. The net growth rate of population
approaches 3.5 percent per year, the highest in the world, and it may
remain very high for a long time to come because about half the
present population is under 16 years old. Kenya's population is expected to double in less than 20 years. Population pressure has
caused a spillover of the human population into drier game-supporting Savannah lands. The time is rapidly approaching when, unless
major new lands are brought into cultivation, there will be less than
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one acre of arable land per person. Some of the best remaining
agricultural lands are in Mosail and on the borders of the Mara game
reserve. It is to these lands that 1,500,000 wild beasts, zebras, and
gazelles from the Serengeti Park come during their seasonal migration. The results of dense human settlement in this area and of
farmers protecting their crops can readily be imagined. Similar situations exist with respect to other African parks.' I Many visitors,
potential visitors, viewers of African films and TV shows, and readers
of natural history all over the world must deeply regret the impending damage to, or ultimate destruction of, one of the world's great
natural spectacles. Ecologists tell us that the associated loss of
genetic information will be irreversible.
In principle, this situation is similar to the technological externality situation discussed earlier. One could readily make an argument
for applying the FC or PP principle-i.e., the East African countries
should bear the cost of maintaining this international treasure and
compensate the rest of the world for damaging it. The situation is not
different from that of one country polluting a river and causing
environmental degradation in another without regard to the values it
destroys.
In practice, however, this type of argument would prove unacceptable. To begin with, the evaluation problems associated with option
demands and preferences of citizens of various culturally diverse
countries are almost certainly unique and intractable. These problems are vastly complicated by the huge differences in value systems
and preferences among countries and the associated complexities in
making interpersonal comparisons. Secondly, the distributional implications are so extreme that, even in the absence of any clear
criterion of justice for international income distribution, most people
would rebel at the thought of wealth transfers from the poorest
people on earth to the richest.
It seems that in this case state responsibility consists of accepting
the VP principle or some limited form of the PP principle under
which the developing country is partially responsible for control costs
and other countries bear all residual damages. Since the site is fixed
geographically with no non-market environmental dependencies,
there are no problems of an efficiency character in its use under a VP
principle so long as external values for its use are completely represented when decisions are made. But unless this principle is accepted
on a multinational basis and the negotiation-arbitration costs of
19. See Myers, The People Crunch Comes to East Africa, 82 NAT. HIST. 10 (1973).
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multinational action can be overcome, other nations may suffer a
highly regrettable irreversible loss. The essential problem to solve here
is the development of an international agency that can facilitate implementation of the VP principle. Limited organizations for specific
sites such as the Nubian monuments have already emerged. But a
much more encompassing institution subsidized by the common
nations appears to be needed. Furthermore, as in all applications of
the VP principle, there is the potential for extortion. But in this case,
it is more self-limiting than in the case of actual transnational pollution. The maximum the "polluter" country can do in this case is to
destroy the internationally valued resource, or threaten to do so.
Problems of InternationalTrade
If external diseconomies associated with waste disposal occur
wholly within the boundaries of a single country with no impact on
external preferences, national efficiency in production-consumption
can be achieved by that country by applying the various principles of
individual or state responsibility described earlier, as long as resources are immobile internally or the state provides additional
restraints on relocation of internal resources. From the global efficiency perspective, however, such autonomous decisions on internal
waste discharge controls may lead to inefficiencies by distorting
international prices and creating a comparative advantage among
countries. Consider, for example, two countries, one accepting the
FC principle internally and the other the VP principle internally.
Even though the first country may have a distinct comparative advantage in producing waste-intensive commodities (i.e., commodities
that have relatively high waste discharges associated with their production), it will be induced, through profit disadvantages in terms of
international trade, to produce commodities with relatively less
waste discharge. In effect, there is a loss in world income because of
the shift away from comparative advantage of the two countries in
providing waste-intensive and extensive commodities. If resources are
mobile internationally, the loss in comparative advantage is even
more pronounced since resources will move in response to incorrect
profit signals. In the long run, the country with a comparative advantage in producing waste-intensive commodities and adopting the FC
principle without other controls will lose resources from this sector
to the country imposing the VP principle.
To achieve global efficiency in resource use thus necessarily requires harmonization of internal principles of responsibility among
nations. The adoption of various principles without harmonization
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results in distortions in international trade highly similar to tariffs
and export subsidies: relative costs are not reflected internationally
in relative prices. It should be pointed out that this is not a direct
problem with external preferences for a fixed, unique site except
through potential distortions in travel, an increasingly important
component of international trade and payments among countries.
While the concept of harmonization of internal principles of
responsibility may be important in the long run, it might be difficult
to achieve now because of the short-term effects on the balance of
payments, national income, and employment. It would appear very
useful in an international context for nations to agree to a general
principle and then allow flexibility in the timing of implementation
to compensate for short-term social effects.
It is important, however, that there be consistency between the
principles of responsibility adopted internally by countries and those
adopted for external responsibility. To see why this is important,
consider the types of incentives that would emerge if a country
adopted an FC principle internally but a VP principle as regards state
responsibility. Firms within that country would then have incentives
to locate and pollute on the boundaries of the country even though
this might not result in efficient use of internal or common property
resources.
Solutions for Developing Countriesand MultinationalCorporations
The developing countries exhibit a great range of environmental
problems, attitudes, and preferences. National sovereignty requires
that developing countries, as well as all others, be given the maximum scope to design their own environmental policies and standards
with respect to their internal environments. Still, it would be closing
one's eyes to reality not to admit that they will have some special
problems in doing so in a way that maximizes the welfare of their
populations. Moreover, population pressures and the quest for rapid
economic development may induce them to use technologies which
produce quick payoffs at the expense of grave, longer term costs to
other nations' environments as well as their own.
One of the most striking aspects of environmental problems in
developing countries is the rate at which they are getting worseespecially in the rapidly urbanizing areas. In Sao Paulo, huge costs
must be incurred soon to try to improve a potentially disastrous
water quality situation. Similar situations appear to prevail in many
other locations. To some extent this is the result of a conscious
policy of delaying expenditures on environmental improvement
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while economic development proceeds. But it also reflects the almost
complete absence of analytical and planning capabilities with respect
to the environment, as well as the primitive state of public policy and
public administration in many developing nations.
Accordingly, state responsibility in the more technically advanced
countries would seem to involve development of a benign paternalism to replace the often exploitative paternalism of the past and
present. Some possible components of this new attitude would be a
system of environmental impact statements to accompany and
ideally to influence the evaluation and design of projects financed by
foreign aid programs. In a primitive way, a program of this kind is
already getting underway under World Bank auspices.
Various types of technical assistance can also be imagined. The
U.N. agencies might be an especially appropriate medium for a program which could include training as well as the provision of technical personnel to help develop local competence in environmental
analysis and planning. Subventions might be provided to make such a
program more attractive.
Finally, several of the more developed countries in which the major
multinational corporations have their headquarters could use whatever control they have over these corporations in the interest of at
least minimal environmental protection in developing countries
where these corporations also operate. It is known from a number of
studies that rather far-reaching environmental protection designed
into a new facility when it is just in place will increase its cost very
little. It is often the last 10 or 20 percent of protection which
becomes very costly. Also, going back and retrofitting existing installations is usually much more costly because of disruptions and
because the range of available technical options is then considerably
restricted. Consequently, an arrangement whereby multinational
corporations agreed, or were required, to design at least minimal
protection into their facilities in developing countries would probably be highly beneficial.
THE PROBLEM OF INFORMATION AND TRANSACTIONS
COSTS OUTLINED
Economists have recognized for a long time that one of the major
impediments to efficient solutions of common property resource
problems is the costs associated with obtaining information, achieving agreement by all interested parties, and maintaining or enforcing
the resulting agreements. These costs are all grouped under the term
"transactions costs"-the cost of successful negotiation per se. In this
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section we briefly outline the ramifications of the various economic
principles of state responsibility when transactions costs are a significant barrier in resolving problems of CPRs.
As discussed earlier, there are three major types of externalities.
One involves preferences for resource conservation outside one's sovereignty; another, direct environmental linkages among countries; the
third, indirect environmental linkages via distortions in trade prices
and patterns. Here we shall only examine the impact of transactions
costs where direct environmental linkages appear in the bilateral
nation case. It must be emphasized that preferences for fixed site
resource in other countries offer many unique and difficult problems
where information costs are high and there is no incentive to pay for
them because of lack of information initially. For example, a country may decide to assert that a particular national treasure is being
preserved when in fact it is being degraded, as long as information on
the resource is not readily available to the citizens of other countries.
The current exploitation of the Amazon jungle is a case in point.
There appear to be four cases regarding transactions costs for
transnational externalities: (1) where transactions costs are always or
nearly zero between emitter and receptor countries; (2) where transactions costs are positive and significant both before and after emergence of an externality; (3) where transactions costs are positive
before the externality appears but zero thereafter; and (4) where
transactions costs are zero before the externality appears but positive
and perceptively significant thereafter. Case (1) can be easily disposed of as one which rules out the existence of externalities that are
not a priori resolved by market or internationally public negotiations. The Coase proposition on the neutrality of property rights is a
special case of (3).20 Case (4) appears to be logically unreasonable.
Finally, case (2) is the important one taxonomically for analyzing
"real world" problems. An important subset of cases under case (2)
arises where transactions costs are different for the two countries
either independent of or dependent upon the prevailing rules for
state responsibility and liability.
Transactions costs may affect negotiations in a multitude of ways,
depending on their source. These include: uncertainty and information gaps (or costs); known or unknown contracting or negotiation
costs; cost associated with organizing and sustaining negotiations
between countries, including dissemination of information; and
enforcement costs for existing contracts. Of these different types of
transactions costs we shall concentrate briefly only on two types20. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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those associated with confronting an uncertain prospect of a future
environmental externality and those associated with negotiation once
the externality has occurred.
A realistic case is one where, under the FC principle, the receptor
country incurs negotiation costs, and under the VP principle, the
emitter country pays such costs. Thus, those who potentially gain are
assumed to initiate negotiation and underwrite the cost of negotiation. Positive negotiation costs, regardless of whether the FC or VP
rule is adopted, will impede negotiation so that the optimal level of
environmental damage activity with zero negotiation costs is never
achieved; the cost of additional accuracy of information, monitoring
precision, etc., at some point will make it not worthwhile to be
closer to this optimum. Costly negotiation where one country incurs
these costs may lead to a case where an FC or PP rule results in a
higher level of externality-generating activity than a VP rule. This
outcome can be induced by differences in marginal utility of income
between the emitter and receptor countries as well as a large number
of assumptions on initial endowments and preferences. The important point here is that it cannot be a priori determined that FC or PP
principles will reduce transnational external diseconomies by a
greater amount than no such principles when negotiation costs are
introduced and must be paid by the country initiating negotiation. If
negotiation costs are different for the two countries, the outcome is
even less clear. It often has been contended, however, that emitters
must have lower negotiation or organization costs than receptors,
since receptor countries generally are numerous while the emitter
often is viewed as a single country-suggesting that an FC or PP
principle might yield a greater reduction in environmentally harmful
effects than a VP principle. Whether this greater reduction is globally
more efficient cannot be established except by individual case. Under
FC or PP rules, the receptor country must undertake negotiation
costs since there is no incentive for the emitter to do so unless some
provision for punitive damage payments could be agreed upon and
enforced. Alternatively, under VP there is an incentive for both
nations to undertake negotiations and incur such costs. Thus, with
regard to incentives to "discover" the extent of environmental harm,
the VP principle appears more efficient. What is important from the
above very brief statements is that FC or PP principles or lack of
them, with transactions costs, requires for allocative efficiency an
additional international rule specifying who must incur these costs.
For example, if the FC principle is adopted but there is a negative
differential between such costs for emitter and receptor, efficiency is
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not obtained if the receptor must always pay them. Without such an
international rule, negotiation in some instances may be completely
stopped and inefficiencies will result.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We have attempted to demonstrate that there is no overarching
principle of state responsibility such as "the polluter pays" which is
politically or economically (in the efficiency sense) applicable to the
entire spectrum of transnational environmental problems. In bilateral
cases of transnational pollution, the adoption of a full costing principle by all nations appears to be relatively efficient if the emitter
country does not compensate the receptor and the receptor country
does not utilize the payments by the emitter country to compensate
firms (or individuals) for damages. In multilateral cases, the FC principle also appears to be the most efficient if the number of receptor
countries is large relative to the number of emitters, because negotiation costs can be expected to be lower. It should be noted that in
both cases, if negotiation or other transactions costs are significant, a
viable internationally agreed-upon rule for identifying who must
incur these costs and setting penalties for not doing so needs to be
specified.
No nation will easily accept international agreement on entitlements of universal common property resources without compensating payments to retain its perception of national wealth. In consequence, the classical answer to externality problems-internalizing
the decision-making process for the resource-is not easily transferable to these transnational problems. A new overriding element of
distributional gains and losses must be simultaneously included in
efficiency considerations. We suggest that with universal CPRs a
special environmental insurance fund be set up under international
auspices, with an agency empowered to allocate such funds to damaged nations and limited authority to establish annual payments or
rebates.
In the case of fixed site preferences in other sovereignties, efficiency is achieved by adoption of either the full costing or victim
pays principle. In consequence, the particular principle of state
responsibility is not of major concern as long as all diverse interests
in the use of the resource are represented. This can be most easily
resolved with the VP principle, provided the requisite information
and mechanisms for negotiation are available. Here we recommend
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the creation of an international agency with the explicit duty of
facilitating information flow and possibilities for negotiation.
Finally, for global efficiency in the utilization of internal as well as
common property resources, we find that the principles of state
responsibility internally need to be harmonized with external principles.

